Is	Brentano's	Method	a	Unifying	Element	of	the	Brentano	School? by Wolfgang	Huemer Università	di	Parma Abstract:	Among	historians	of	philosophy	it	is	often	taken	for	granted	that	the	"Brentano school"	was	one	of	the	influential	philosophical	movements	at	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	and the	beginning	of	the	twentieth	century	–	but	Brentano's	own	contributions	are	often	eclipsed by	that	of	his	direct	students.	This	invites	to	reflect	on	the	nature	of	and	the	unity	within	the school.	Since	Brentano's	conception	of	a	rigorous,	scientific	philosophy	had	a	strong	impact on	his	students,	it	has	been	argued	that	this	conception	constitutes	a	unifying	element	in	an otherwise	heterogeneous	group.	The	scope	of	this	article	is	to	shed	light	on	this	thesis	and	to show	its limits.	I	argue	for	a	differentiated	view:	the	Brentano	school	is	best	seen	not	as	a compact	movement,	but	as	a	heterogeneous	group	of	scholars	who	approached,	in	a	given historical	and	geographical	period,	similar	topics	in	very	similar	ways. Keywords:	Franz Brentano; Brentano-school; philosophy as rigorous science; Edmund Husserl;	Alexius	Meinong;	descriptive	pscychology Brentano	had	a	somewhat	peculiar	position	in	the	history	of	philosophy.	At	the	time	when	he started	to	publish,	the	traditions	of	German	idealism	and	system	philosophy	had	come	to	an end	and	made	way	for	a	new,	more	scientifically	orientated	conception	of	philosophy.	While Brentano	saw	himself	as	an	innovator	who	actively	participated	in	the	attempt	to	shape	a	new paradigm	of	research	in	philosophy	and	psychology,	he	is	nowadays	often	only	mentioned	for having	introduced	the	notion	of	intentionality	and	for	the	long	and	impressive	list	of	students who	he	has	taught	–	but	his	own	contributions	to	philosophy	are	hardly	discussed;	his	students seem	to	have	had	a	much	stronger	impact	on	the	development	of	philosophy	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century.	This	raises	the	question	for	the	nature	and	impact	of	Brentano's	school.	In	particular,	we	might	ask	whether	there	is	a	unity	among	the	direct	students	of Brentano	that	would	allow	us	to	speak	of	a	school	or	a	movement	in	a	narrow	sense,	i.e.	a	homogeneous	group	of	scholars	who jointly	elaborate	a	shared	philosophical	perspective.	This question	seems	relevant,	as	the	"Brentano	school"	has	gained	increasing	attention	over	the	last decades. Since	it	was	proposed	recently	that	Brentano's	conception	of	a	rigorous,	scientific	philosophy	and	his	metaphilosophical	views	are	unifying	elements	of	the	Brentano	school,	I	will pay	particular	attention	at	the	role	Brentano's	views	on	the	true	method	of	philosophy	have had	for	his	impact	on	students	and	for	the	formation	of	the	school.	In	the	first	part	of	the	present article,	I	will	reconstruct	the	role	Brentano's	methodological	maxim	has	had	for	his	philosophical	self-understanding.	Then	I	will	proceed	to	reconstructing	the	impact	of	this	maxim	on	his Aappeared in: Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, CXI (2019), 4, pp. 897-910 ISSN: 00356247 (print) 18277926 (digital) DOI: 10.26350/001050_000151 Penultimate draft. Please quote from printed version 2 direct	students.	In	the	final	part	will	focus	on	the	very	idea	of	a	"Brentano	school".	In	particular, I	will	discuss	the	philosophical	unity	of	the	school	and	mention	some	contingent	historical	circumstances	that	have	shaped	its	development. 1.	Brentano's	views	concerning	philosophical	method	and	their	role	within	a	larger	picture Throughout	his	lifetime,	Brentano	continued	to	develop	and	refine	his	views.	As	he	approached philosophy in	a	very systematic	manner	and	always	kept the	bigger	picture in	mind,	minor changes	in	single	parts	of	his	philosophical	views	often	brought	about	modifications	or	adjustments	in	his	overall	position.1	There	are,	however,	several	themes	in	Brentano's	thought	that show	remarkable	continuity,	such	as	his	views	concerning	the	correct	method	of	philosophy. He	formulated	the	maxim	that	philosophy	should	adopt	the	strict	and	rigorous	method	of	the natural	sciences	already	early in	his	career,	at	his	Habilitations-defense in	18662,	and	found various	occasions	to	reaffirm	and	elaborate	his	conception	in	publications	and	lectures	later	in his	life. Brentano's	views	on	the	subject	remain	substantially	unaltered,	though	we	can	notice	a slight	change	regarding	their	dialectical	function.	In	the	early	formulations	of	the	thesis,	its	negative	impact	seems	to	be	dominant.	At	his	Habilitations-defense,	for	example,	Brentano	merely states	the	thesis,	but	does	not	spell	out	in	detail	how	a	rigorous	and	scientific	method	could	be applied	in	philosophy.	It	seems,	thus,	that	he	was	mainly	interested	in	stating	how	philosophy should	not	be	done:	Brentano's	maxim	arguably	served	to	demarcate	his	own	position	from	the dominant	traditions	of	German	idealism	and	system	philosophy.	In	particular,	his	fourth	Habilitations-thesis	was	part	of	a	strategy	to	take	distance	from	Schellingianism3,	which	at	the	time had	a	secure	standing	at	the	University	of	Würzburg,	where	the	Habilitation	took	place.4	Brentano,	thus,	did	not	shy	away	from	attacking	a	philosophical	approach	that	had	been	adopted	by 1	This	does	not	imply	that	Brentano	intended	to	present	a	system,	as	was	suggested	in	the	recent	literature	(cf.	U. Kriegel,	Brentano's	Philosophical	Program,	in	U.	Kriegel	(ed.)	The	Routledge	Handbook	of	Franz	Brentano	and	the Brentano	School,	Routledge,	New	York	2017,	pp.	21-32,	an	assessment	that	brings	Brentano	dangerously	close	to German	system	philosophy,	which	definitely	does	not	do	justice	to	the	his	own	understanding	of	his	work.	For	a more	detailed	discussion,	cf.	W.	Huemer,	Was	Brentano	a	systematic	philosopher? in	M.	Antonelli	and	T.	Binder (eds.)	The	Philosophy	of	Franz	Brentano,	Brill,	Leiden	forthcoming. 2	At	the	occasion	of	his	Habilitations-defense,	which	took	place	on	July	14,	1866,	Brentano	posted	25	theses	in Latin,	the	fourth	of	which	reads:	«Vera	philosophiae	methodus	nulla	alia	nisi	scientiae	naturalis	est»	[«The	true method	of	philosophy	is	none	other	than	that	of	the	natural	sciences»].	The	theses	are	reprinted	in	F.	Brentano, Über	die	Zukunft	der	Philosophie,	Oskar	Kraus	(ed.),	Meiner,	Leipzig	1929,	p.	136f. 3	This	becomes	particularly	evident	when	studied	in	connection	with	the	second	thesis,	in	which	Brentano	attacks the	idea	that	revelation	[Offenbarung]	could	be	a	source	of	knowledge	in	philosophy	–	a	claim	that	can	be	read	as a	direct	attack	on	Schelling. 4	Schelling	was	professor	at	the	University	of	Würzburg	from	1803-1806.	Moreover,	Brentano	recalls	that	at	the time	of	his	Habilitation,	the	two	professors	of	philosophy	at	Würzburg,	Franz	Hoffmann	and	a	certain	Maier	[sic!], were	both	direct	students	of	Schelling	(cf.	Ibi.	p.	106).	Hoffmann	was	a	direct	student	both	of	Schelling	and	Baader. When	Brentano	mentions	«Maier,	der	Vater	des	Nationalökonmen»	(Ibidem)	he	probably	refers	to	Alois	Mayr, 3 several	members	of	the	exam	committee	–	a	move	that	was	not	without	risk5,	but	allowed	him to	depict	the	mainstream	position	as	outdated	and	at	the	same	time	to	present	his	own	position –	or	better:	the	position	he	intended	to	develop	in	full	detail	in	the	years	after	the	Habilitation –	as	an	innovative	and	original	alternative. When	Brentano	came	back	to	discuss	the	method	of	philosophy	later	in	his	life,	on	the other	hand,	he	seemed	to	have	more	constructive	intentions.	His	main	goal	was	no	longer	to demarcate	his	own	position	from	the	ones	that	had	dominated	the	philosophical	landscape	of Germany	until	the	mid-nineteenth	century.	Rather,	the	way	he	talked	about	the	correct	method father	of	the	economist	Georg	Mayr,	who	is	the	only	Mayr	(by	this	or	any	similar	spelling)	listed	at	the	Verzeichniss der	Vorlesungen	of	the	University	of	Würzburg,	faculty	of	philosophy,	at	the	time.	Mayr	was	primarily	a	mathematician,	but	also	taught	courses	on	philosophy. 5	With	his	direct	and	polemic	way	of	defending	his	philosophical	views,	Brentano	risked	offending	the	professors at	Würzburg	who	not	only	had	to	judge	about	his	Habilitation,	but	also	were	called	to	decide	on	his	academic	future only	four	years	later.	In	fact,	when	Brentano	formally	asked	to	be	promoted	from	Privatdozent	to	ausserordentlicher Professor	in	1870,	his	application	was	welcomed	by	the	faculty	in	a	meeting	in	July,	but	a	definite	decision	was delayed to	a later	moment. In	early	December	1870,	however,	Brentano's	application	was	voted	down.	There seems	to	have	been	a	heated	discussion,	for	several	professors	felt	the	need	to	express	their	diverging	opinions, and,	thus,	to	support	Brentano's	application,	in	so-called	Separatvoten,	i.e.	text	that	are	added	to	the	minutes	of	a faculty	meeting	and	in	which	individual	members	of	the	meeting	can	voice	their	disagreement	with	the	majority decision.	These	Separatvoten	are	reprinted	in	T.	Freudenberger,	Die	Universität	Würzburg	und	das	erste	vatikanische	Konzil:	ein	Beitrag	zur	Kirchenund	Geistesgeschichte	des	19.	Jahrhunderts,	Degener,	Neustadt	a.d.	Aisch	1969, pp.	457-64.	These	Separatvoten	were	successful	as	they	were	received	by	the	senate	of	the	University	of	Würzburg, who	decided	in	February	1871 to	submit	Brentano's	application to the	ministry	and, thus,	made	possible that Brentano	was	promoted	to	ausserordentlicher	Professor	on	May	13,	1872.	Interestingly	enough,	Franz	Hoffmann made	the	unusual	move	to	draft	a	Separatvotum,	even	though	he	agreed	with	the	majority	decision	of	the	faculty meeting.	The	way	in	which	he	presents	his	reasons	for	the	view	that	Brentano	should	not	be	promoted	to	ausserordentlicher	Professor	show	that	the	relation	between	Brentano	and	Hoffmann	were	not	without	friction.	Apart from	criticizing	Brentano	for	the	short	list	of	publications	(a	fact	that	is	mentioned,	but	not	considered	decisive also	by	those	who	drafted	a	Separatvotum	in	favor	of	Brentano)	Hoffmann	calls	Brentano	«a	minor	important beginner,	who,	after	having	been	friendly	supported	by	me, treated	me ignobly» [my translation:	«noch	wenig bedeutenden	Anfänger,	der	von	mir	auf	das	freundlichste	gefördert	worden	war	und	sich	ignobel	gegen	mich	betragen hatte»	(Ibi,	p.	460).	Hoffmann	calls	Brentano	«ungrateful	and	inconsiderate»	[«undankbar	und	rücksichtslos»	(Ibi, p.	462)].	At	one	point	he	describes	him	as	a	«talented	young	scholar,	whose	development	of	life	and	orientation	of mind	should	have	guided	him	towards	theology.	As	a	professor	of	Dogmatics	or	the	History	of	Dogmas	or	of	Patristics	at	a	theological	faculty	he	probably	could	have	achieved	in	short	time	excellent,	maybe	even	outstanding results.	As	a	philosopher	one	can	expect	hardly	more	from	him	than	a	scant	repristination	of	medieval	scholastics that	shows	mainly	Aristotelian	influences,	brought	into	a	modern	shape	and	adorned	with	some	modern	ingredients»	(Ibi,	p.	461).	[(My	translation:	«Dr.	Brentano	ist	ein	begabter	jüngerer	Gelehrter,	dessen	Lebensentwicklung und	Geistesrichtung	ihn	auf	die	Theologie	hätte	hinweisen	soIIen.	Als	Professor	der	Dogmatik,	der	Dogmengeschichte, der	Patristik	an	einer	theologischen	Fakultät	würde	er	wahrscheinlich	nach	einiger	Zeit	Vorzügliches,	vielleicht	Ausgezeichnetes	leisten.	Als	Philosoph	steht	kaum	etwas	Anderes	von	ihm	zu	erwarten	als	eine	unzulängliche	Repristination	der	vorwiegend	unter	aristotelischen	Einflüssen	erwachsenen	mittelalterlichen	Scholastik,	in	moderne	Formen gegossen	und	mit	einigen	modernen	Zutaten	ausgeschmückt.»]	In	a	good	part	of	the	Separatvotum,	Hoffmann	spells out	how	harmful	it	could	be	if	only	a	single	Catholic	priest	would	become	philosophy	professor	at	Würzburg.	He expresses	his	fears	that	illiberal	tendencies	in	the	Catholic	church	–	tendencies	that	have	become,	in	Hoffmann's view,	manifest	in	the	dogma	of	papal	infallibility,	which	had	been	promulgated	in	the	same	year	–	would	threaten academic	freedom	in	Würzburg's	philosophical	faculty.	Ironically,	Hoffmann	seems	to	project	his	aversion	against the	first	Vatican	council	on	Brentano.	He	obviously	had	not	taken	notice	of	the	fact	that	Brentano	himself	struggled with	the	results	of	the	council	and	especially	with	the	dogma	of	papal	infallibility,	which	caused	him,	as	is	well known,	to	eventually	withdraw	from	priesthood	–	and	from	the	position	that	Hoffmann	wanted	to	deny	him.	Incidentally,	also	the	second	direct	student	of	Schelling	at	the	faculty,	Alois	Mayr,	has	drafted	a	Separatvotum.	Mayer seemed	to	have	had	a	much	more	positive	opinion	of	Brentano,	though.	Not	only	did	he	welcome	Brentano's	promotion	to	ausserordentlicher	Professor,	he	even	suggested	he	should	have	been	promoted	to	full	professor,	if	there was	the	possibility	to	do	so;	Cf.	Ibi,	p.	458f. 4 of	philosophy	is	directed	towards	the	future	development	of	the	discipline.	This	became	particularly	manifest	in	two	respects.	First, in	several	occasions	he	spells	out,	in	more	detail	compared	to	his	early	statement,	how	a	scientific	and	rigorous	method	can	be	applied	in	philosophy. Brentano,	thus,	made	an	effort	to	determine	in	a	clear	and	explicit	manner	how	research	in	the young	discipline	of	psychology	ought	to	be	conducted.6	Second,	if	we	consider	Brentano's	cyclic model	of	the	history	of	philosophy,	we	see	that	his	maxim	on	method	also	allowed	him	to	mark his	own	position	in	the	discipline.	According	to	this	model,	which	he	had	developed	from	1860 on7	but	has	presented	in	print	only	in	18958,	the	three	periods	in	the	history	of	philosophy	– ancient,	medieval	and	modern	philosophy	–	can	be	subdivided	into	four	phases:	the	first	is	a phase	of	ascending	development	that	is	marked	by	a	«lively	and	pure	theoretical	interest»9.	The other	three	are	phases	of	decline:	In	the	second	phase,	the	pure	theoretical	interest	and	profundity	diminish;	it	is	a	phase	of	divulgation,	the	achievements	of	the	first	phase	are	explored	and scholars	are	mainly	interested	in	the	practical	application	of	the	results	of	the	first	phase.	In this	process,	the	new	paradigm	starts	to	show	its	limits,	people	lose	their	trust	in	science.	A general	skeptical	attitude	gains	ground	and	comes	to	dominate	the	third	phase,	which	is	the second	phase	of	decline.	But	this	leaves	unsatisfied,	as	people	have	a	natural	inclination	to	strive for knowledge.	With «pathologically intensified enthusiasm	people start once	more to construct	philosophical	dogmas»10,	but	they	do	so	relying	on	unnatural	sources	of	knowledge,	on «ingenious 'directly intuitive' powers,	mystical intensifications of the	mental life»11: in the fourth	phase,	skepticism	turns	into	mysticism.	With	this,	the	development	comes	to	an	end	and a	new	cycle	can	begin	–	and	it	will	do	so	with	a	phase	of	ascending	development,	which	will	be made	possible	by	a	new	shift in	paradigm that	brings into	view	phenomena that	have	been 6	Brentano	described	his	method	already	in	his	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint,	O.	Kraus	and	L.L.	McAlister	(eds.),	A.C.	Rancurello,	D.	B.	Terrell,	and	L.L.	McAlister	(trans.),	Routledge,	London	&	New	York	1995,	but	his description	of	the	method	remained	still	quite	general	and	contained	aspects	that	have	never	been	fully	developed neither	in	Psychology,	nor	in	later	texts	and	can,	thus,	be	considered	"dead	ends"	(take,	for	example,	Brentano's remark	on	the	importance	of	«the	study	of	autobiographies	for	the	psychologist»	(Ibi,	p.	29),	which,	as	far	as	I know,	has	never	been	taken	up	by	him	or	any	of	his	students.)	Brentano	did	continue	to	refine	and	elaborate	his method.	He	presented	his	views	mainly	in	lectures,	though,	which	could	be	taken	to	show	that	he	intended	to	teach the	method	to	a	younger	generation.	Some	of	these	lecture	notes	have	been	made	available	in	his	Descriptive	Psychology,	B.	Müller	(trans.),	Routledge,	London	&	New	York	1995. 7	«The	first	time	Brentano	was	struck	by	this	idea,	as	he	later	told	me,	was	during	his	convalescence	from	a	serious illness	(Easter	1860).»	C.	Stumpf,	Reminiscences	of	Franz	Brentano,	in	L.L.	McAlister	(ed.),	The	Philosophy	of	Brentano,	L.L.	McAlister	and	M.	Schättle	(trans.)	Duckworth,	London	1976,	pp.	10-46,	p.	11. 8	F.	Brentano,	The	Four	Phases	of	Philosophy,	in	B.M.	Mezei	and	B.	Smith	(eds.),	The	Four	Phases	of	Philosophy, Rodopi,	Amsterdam	&	Atlanta,	GA	1998,	pp.	81-111. 9	Ibi,	p.	85f. 10	Ibi,	p.	86. 11	Ibidem. 5 overlooked	so	far	and	requires	a	new	methodological	framework	«that	is	essentially	appropriate	to	nature»12. In	the	light	of	this	model,	it	seems	plausible	to	suggest	that	Brentano's	later	statements concerning	the	right	method	of	philosophy	do	not	aim	primarily	at	distinguishing	himself	from other	philosophical	traditions,	but	rather	at	presenting	his	own	philosophical	position	as	a	contribution	to	the	inauguration	of	a	phase	of	ascending	development	that	could	mark	the	beginning	of	a	new,	fourth	period	in	the	history	of	philosophy13	–	an	achievement	which,	as	he	states in	his	1894 lecture	on	the	Four	Phases	of	Philosophy,	will	be	«accomplished	by	us	or	by	our successors».14 In	addition,	the	development	of	a	new	method	for	philosophy	can	have	a	collateral	effect, of	which	Brentano	was	definitely	aware:	A	philosopher	who	succeeds in introducing	a	new methodological	framework	is	not	only	in	a	position	to	substantiate	the	idea	that	he	was	able	to conduct	research	in	new	directions	and	pay	due	attention	to	phenomena	that	others	might	have overlooked	–	and,	thus,	to	show	that	his	own	contribution	goes	essentially	beyond	the	"state	of the	art".	He	can	also	nourish	the	hope	that	a	new	generation	of	scholars,	who	see	the	relevance of	this	new	framework	and	develop	an	interest	in	the	new	fields	of	study,	will	be	willing	to	adopt it	and,	thus,	elaborate	and	refine	the	research	project	that	the	philosopher	who	introduced	it	in the first place	might have only sketched in its general traits. The new	method	might, thus, launch a new tradition or school that elevates his contribution from the level of individual achievement	to	that	of	a	collective	enterprise. In	both	respects,	the	negative	impulse	of	demarcation	and	the	positive	goal	of	establishing a new	methodological framework for philosophical research, Brentano's attempts have proven	successful,	albeit	–	especially	with	regard	to	the	second	point	–	on	a	more	modest	scale than	he	might	have	hoped.	He	definitely	managed	to	mark	the	differences	between	his	own position	and	the	tradition	of	German	Idealism	which,	in	the	eyes	of	many,	had	already	come	to a	dead	end	at	the	time.	It	is	less	obvious,	however,	that	Brentano	has	actually	achieved	what	he had	hoped	for	with	respect	to	setting	up	a	tradition,	a	school,	or	a	movement	of	scholars	who 12	Ibi,	p.	85f. 13	Brentano	has	expressed	his	conviction	that	there	is	a	strong	tie	between	the	development	of	a	new	method	and the	beginning	of	a	new	phase	in	philosophy	already	in	1866.	In	his	Habilitations-lecture	on	Schelling,	he	states	that «[t]he	great	turning	points	in	the	developments	of	a	science	indisputably	come	along	with	a	change	of	method» Brentano,	Über	die	Zukunft	der	Philosophie,	p.	108. 14	Brentano,	The	Four	Phases	of	Philosophy,	p.	110.	The	way	in	which	Brentano	sets	up	his	model	definitely	invites for	this	thought.	Balázs	Mezei	and	Barry	Smith	make	this	inference	explicitly	and	state	in	a	text	that	accompanies the	English	translation	of	the	lecture,	which	they	have	edited,	that	Brentano	was	"as	representing	the	first,	ascending	phase	in	the	current	cycle	of	philosophical	development."	Balázs	M	Mezei	and	Barry	Smith,	The	Four	Phases	of Philosophy	(Amsterdam,	Atlanta,	GA:	Rodopi,	1998),	p.	42. 6 would	have	continued	to	conduct	research	in	the	theoretical	framework	he	had	introduced.15 This	might	sound	controversial,	as	Brentano	nowadays	is	often	introduced	with	reference	to the	long	and	impressive	list	of	students	that	have	studied	with	him.	Moreover,	the	term	"Brentano	school"	is	often	used	to	refer	to	a	group	of	clearly	defined	philosophers	who	worked	on	a related	set	of	topics.16	There	are,	of	course,	good	reasons	for	grouping	philosophers	like	Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Edmund Husserl, Alexius Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Kasimir Twardowski,	and	others	under	one	heading:	all	of	them	build	on	central	notions	of	Brentano's philosophy,	most	notably	on	the	notion	of	intentionality,	and	all	of	them	dedicated	a	good	part of	their	energy	to	the	development	of	a	philosophical	psychology	or,	more	generally,	the	study of	consciousness.	Still,	I	would	like	to	propose	a	more	differentiated	view	that	acknowledges the	common	points	of	departure,	but	also	pays	due	attention	to	the	heterogeneity	that	is	to	be found	in	this	group	–	and	will	illustrate	this	point	by	sketching	the	way	in	which	Brentano's conception	of	philosophy	as	a	rigorous	science	was	received. 2.	The	fascination	of	Brentano's	maxim	concerning	method The	idea	that	the	early	Brentano	tried	to	distinguish	himself	from	the	current	mainstream	by insisting	on	the	conception	of	a	rigorous,	scientific	philosophy	was	definitely	perceived	by	the philosophy	professors	of	the	University	of	Würzburg	who	were	members	of	the	exam	committee.	We	know	from	Brentano's	own	testimony,	but	also	from	that	of	Carl	Stumpf,	that	already during	the	Habilitations-defense,	Brentano's	fourth	thesis	was	harshly	attacked	by	members	of the	committee,	in	particular	by	Schelling's	student	Franz	Hoffmann	and	by	the	philologist	Carl 15	If	we	take	into	consideration	the	opinions	voiced	by	some	of	Brentano's	direct	students,	it	is	not	clear,	however, whether	and	to	what	extent	it	was	Brentano's	intention	to	found	a	new	school	that	bears	his	name	in	the	first	place. Carl	Stumpf,	for	example,	suggests	that	Brentano	was	opposed	to	this	very	idea.	In	his	Reminiscences,	he	states	that «he	[i.e.,	Brentano]	was,	on	principle	and	with	every	right,	against	the	development	of	a	'school'	that	swears	by	his every	word»	Stumpf,	Reminiscences	of	Franz	Brentano,	p.	44.	I	think	that	we	should	take	this	statement	with	caution,	though.	Brentano	always	upheld	the	ideal	of	educating	his	students	to	become	independent	thinkers	rather than	blind followers.	It is	noteworthy,	however, that	both	Husserl (cf.	Reminiscences	of	Franz	Brentano, in	L.L. McAlister	(ed.),	The	Philosophy	of	Brentano,	L.L.	McAlister	and	M.	Schättle	(trans.),	Duckworth,	London	1976,	pp. 47.55,	p.	51)	and	Meinong	(cf.	Selbstdarstellung,	in	R.	Schmidt	(ed.)	Die	Philosophie	der	Gegenwart	in	Selbstdarstellungen,	Meiner,	Leipzig	1923,	pp.	100-160,	p.	104)	mention	that	Brentano	was	typically	not	reacting	well	when one	of	his	students	turned	against	his	own	position	or	departed	in	ways	that	he	could	not	approve.	This	way	of reacting	can	be	read	as	an	expression	of	Brentano's	hope	that	his	students	would	accept	his	general,	overall	framework	and	to	work	within	its	parameters.	Contrary	to	Stumpf's	statement	there	is,	thus,	evidence,	that	Brentano did	like	the	idea	that	there	might	be	a	Brentano	school	in	which	his	approach	is	further	elaborated.	Husserl	expressed	this	assessment	explicitly	in	his	Reminiscences,	where	he	stated	that	Brentano's	«inner	certainty	that	he was	moving	in	the	right	direction	and	was	founding	a	purely	scientific	philosophy	never	wavered»	and	then	continues	with	the	following	words:	«This	explains,	first,	why	being	a	deeply	penetrating	and	effective	teacher,	indeed, why	having	a	school	(in	the	good	sense)	was	so	important	to	him:	not	only	for	the	dissemination	of	the	insights achieved,	but	also	for	the	continued	work	on	his	thoughts.»	Husserl,	Reminiscences	of	Franz	Brentano,	p.	51. 16	For	an	illustration	of	this	point,	a	reference	to	the	following	two	volumes	might	suffice:	L.	Albertazzi,	M.	Libardi, and	R.	Poli	(eds.),	The	School	of	Franz	Brentano,	Kluwer,	Dordrecht	1996;	U.	Kriegel	(ed.),	The	Routledge	Handbook of	Franz	Brentano	and	the	Brentano	School,	Routledge,	New	York	2017). 7 Ludwig	Urlichs.17	When	Brentano	gave	a	lecture	on	Schelling	in	December	188918,	he	read	in large	parts	from	the	manuscript	that	he	had	prepared	for	the	lecture	at	the	occasion	of	his	Habilitation	more	than	23	years	earlier.	In	the	introductory	remarks,	he	shares	his	recollections of	the	Habilitations-defense	and	says,	with	reference	to	Alois	Mayr	and	Franz	Hoffmann: Schelling's	students,	thus,	were	my	judges.	And	I	had	to	be	doubly	careful.	For	my	judges	were at	the	same	time	the	adverse	party;	and	they	knew	my	as	opponent	for	I	stepped	into	the	field with	an	open	visor.	For	among	the	25	theses,	which	I	had	posted	for	public	defense,	one,	which they	chose	to	become	primary	target	of	attack,	was:	Vera	philosophiae	methodus	nulla	alia	nisi scientiae	naturalis	est.19 It	is	noteworthy	that	Brentano	uses	the	metaphor	of	a	medieval	tournament	to	describe his	Habilitations-defense,	which	is	actually	an	exam.	Moreover,	Carl	Stumpf	uses	the	same	metaphor	when	he	describes	the	event	in	his	Reminiscences.20	This	choice	of	wording	echoes	that Brentano	and	his	closer	circle	recalled	this	event	not	as	a	cordial	and	harmonious	discussion, nor	as	an	exam	in	which	the	student	tries	to	show	that	he	has	absorbed	the	view	of	his	academic teachers,	but	rather	as	an	intense	exchange	and	confrontation	in	which	a	young	and	rising	contestant	dared	to	challenge	the	traditional	understanding	of	philosophy	and	its	method	–	and that	he	did	so	in	a	quite	vehement	or	even	polemic	manner. Brentano,	thus,	stood	up	for	his	views	and	it	seems	that	he	has	done	so	in	an	impressive manner	–	at	least	in	the	eyes	of	(parts	of)	the	audience.	We	can	assume	that	it	was	in	particular the	young	students	who	cheered.	Carl	Stumpf,	who	was	one	of	them	at	the	time,	writes:	«The way	in	which	Brentano	defended	and	explained	his	theses	revealed	him	to	be	so	superior	to	his 17	Cf.	Stumpf,	Reminiscences	of	Franz	Brentano,	p.	11.	Incidentally,	at	the	occasion	of	the	debate	concerning	Brentano's	promotion	to	ausserordentlicher	Professor	in	December	1870	(cf.	above,	footnote	5),	also	Urlichs	drafted	a Separatvotum,	where	he	expressed	himself	in	favor	of	Brentano's	promotion. 18	Über	Schellings	Philosophie, lecture	given	at	the	Philosophische	Gesellschaft	on	December	17,	1889.	Brentano acknowledges	that	the	lecture	is	in	great	parts	identical	to	his	inaugural	lecture	he	had	given	at	the	occasion	of	his Habilitations-defense	on	July	14,	1866	(with	the	title	«Über	Schellings	Philosophie	in	ihren	verschiedenen	Phasen, Darstellung	und	Kritik»).	According	to	Carl	Stumpf,	it	was	not	Brentano	who	chose	to	speak	on	this	topic;	probably it	was	set	by	Hoffmann,	cf.	Stumpf,	Reminiscences	of	Franz	Brentano,	p.	11. 19	Brentano,	Über	die	Zukunft	der	Philosophie,	p.	106f.	My	translation:	«Schellings	Schüler	waren	also	meine	Richter. Und	ich	musste	doppelt	achtsam	sein.	Denn	meine	Richter	waren	zugleich	die	mir	feindliche	Partei;	und	sie	kannten mich	als	Gegner,	da	ich	mit	offenem	Visier	in	die	Schranken	trat.	Denn	unter	den	25	Thesen,	die	ich	damals	zur	öffentlichen	Verteidigung	anschlug,	lautete	eine,	die	sie	sofort	zum	Ziel	des	Angriffs	wählten:	Vera	philosophiae	methodus nulla	alia	nisi	scientiae	naturarum	est.». 20	Cf.	C.	Stumpf,	Erinnerungen	an	Franz	Brentano,	in	O.	Kraus	(ed.),	Franz	Brentano:	Zur	Kenntnis	seines	Lebens und	seiner	Werke,	Beck,	München	1919,	pp.	85-149,	p.	88.	In	the	English	translation,	the	German	term	«Turnier» is	translated	with	«battle	of	wits»	in	Stumpf,	Reminiscences	of	Franz	Brentano,	p.	11.,	which	does	not	conserve	the metaphor	and,	thus,	risks	at	not	doing	full	justice	to	the	quarrelsome	spirit	of	the	formulation. 8 attackers	that	I	decided	then	and	there	to	attend	his	lectures	in	the	autumn.»21	Stumpf	adds	that it	was	in	particular	Brentano's	views	on	the	method	of	philosophy	that	caught	his	attention: We	were	especially	happy	that	the	method	he	claimed	for	philosophy	was	none	other	than	that of	the	natural	sciences,	and	that	he	based	his	hopes	for	a	rebirth	of	philosophy	on	this	method. It	was	a	new,	incomparably	deeper	and	more	serious	way	of	understanding	philosophy.22 Stumpf's	testimony	clearly	underlines	the	importance	of	Brentano's	conception	of	philosophy	as	a	strict	and	rigorous	science	for	the	formation	of	the	first	group	of	students.	It	is remarkable,	however,	that	this	holds	not	only	for	the	first	–	and	probably	most	faithful	–	generation	of	students	in	Würzburg;	we	have	testimonies	also	of	students	who	attended	Brentano's lectures	in	Vienna,	who	mention	Brentano's	conception	of	philosophy	as	a	rigorous	science	as the	element	that	had	primarily	caught	their	attention	or	deserved	their	admiration.	Alois	Höfler, for	example,	who	attended	Brentano's	lectures	in	Vienna	from	1877	on,	expresses	in	his	otherwise	quite	bitter	obituary	his	«...honest	and	until	today	not	diminished	thankfulness	for	the	fact that	I	have	found	in	Brentano	really	the	very	first	teacher,	who	taught	me	to	apply	in	philosophical	matters	the	same	rigorous	standards,	as	I	have	learnt	in	mathematics	and	physics...»23. When	Edmund	Husserl	attended	Brentano's	lectures	at	the	University	of	Vienna	in	18841886,	he	did	not	see	a	provocative	young	scholar,	but	an	arrived	and	charismatic	philosopher who	had	many	followers.	Like	Stumpf24,	also	Husserl	noted	that	the	encounter	with	Brentano had	convinced	him	to	pursue	a	career	in	philosophy25	–	and	also	he	mentioned	Brentano's	conception	of	a	rigorous,	scientific	philosophy	as	decisive	element.	In	his	Reminiscences,	he	suggests	that	he	owes	to	Brentano	the	«conviction	that	philosophy,	too,	is	a	field	of	serious	endeavour,	and	that	it	too	can	–	and,	in	fact,	must	–	be	dealt	with	in	a	rigorously	scientific	manner».26 These	testimonies	are	significant,	for	they	show	two	things:	first,	Brentano	insisted	on questions	concerning	the	right	method	in	philosophy	in	all	phases	of	his	career	as	academic teacher,	both	by	applying	a	rigorous	and	scientific	style	of	reasoning	and	by	explicitly	reflecting 21	Ibidem.	In	this	term,	Brentano	lectured	on	History	of	Philosophy.	The	course	is	not	listed	in	the	official	Verzeichniss	der	Vorlesungen	of	the	University	of	Würzburg.	Brentano,	however,	makes	reference	to	it	in	his	application	to become	ausserordentlicher	Professor,	which	is	reprinted	in	Freudenberger. 22	Ibidem. 23	A.	Höfler,	Franz	Brentano	in	Wien,	in	«Süddeutsche	Monatshefte»,	München,	May	1917,	pp.	319-25,	p.	321.	[My translation:	«...	die	aufrichtige	und	bis	heute	nicht	geschwundene	Dankbarkeit	dafür,	dass	ich	ja	in	Brentano	wirklich den	allerersten	Lehrer	gefunden	hatte,	der	mich	in	philosophischen	Dingen	ebenso	strenge	Massstäbe	anlegen	lehrte, wie	ich	es	in	Mathematik	und	Physik	gelernt	hatte...»] 24	cf.	Stumpf,	Reminiscences	of	Franz	Brentano,	p.	12. 25	Husserl,	Reminiscences	of	Franz	Brentano,	p.	48. 26	Ibidem. 9 on	questions	concerning	method	in	his	lectures.27	Second,	Brentano's	style	of	reasoning	and	his new	methodological	outlook	fascinated	students,	awakened	or	reinforced	their	interest	for	philosophy	and	philosophical	psychology,	and	significantly	shaped	their	views.	In	fact,	most	of	his students	who	continued	to	work	in	philosophy	adopted	central	notions	of	Brentano's	philosophy	–	most	importantly,	the	notion	of	intentionality	–	as	integral,	central	elements	of	their	own philosophical	positions	and	remained	(by	and	large)	faithful	to	Brentano's	conception	of	scientific	philosophy,	understood	in	a	broad	sense,	even	though	many	of	them	have	found	it	necessary	to	further	develop	or	emend	it.	This	shows	that	Brentano's	views	on	method	were	a	central element	– in	combination	with	his	didactic talents	– for	Brentano's	success	among	students. From a historical	or sociological perspective, it definitely seems	plausible to individuate in Brentano's	conception	concerning	the	method	of	philosophy	a	unifying	element	that	allowed Brentano	to	form	a	group	of	students	who	were	willing	to	conduct	their	own	research	within this	larger	framework. 3.	Seeing	the	differences The	discussion	of	the	preceding	sections	illustrates	primarily	the	«power	that	Brentano	exercised	over	susceptible	students»28:	he	offered	a	new	and	original	outlook	that	promised	to	leave behind	the	"old"	traditions	of	German	idealism	and	system	philosophy.	Moreover,	he	drew	the attention	of	his	most	talented	students	to	questions	related	to	the	study	of	mind	and	consciousness	and	to	the	emerging	discipline	of	psychology:	new	fields	in	which	students	felt	they	could conduct	cutting-edge	research	and	contribute	in	the	exploration	of	"dark	continents"29	that	had not	been	explored	beforehand. For showing that Brentano's	method could be considered a	unifying element for the Brentano	school,	however,	one	would	also	have	to	show	that	it	was	applied,	by	the	members	of a	school,	in	a	(more	or	less)	uniform	way.	I	fear	that	in	this	respect	we	will	find	far	less	homo- 27	Some	of	the	later	Vienna	lectures	on	method	have	been	published	in	F.	Brentano,	Descriptive	Psychology. 28	Stumpf,	Reminiscences	of	Franz	Brentano,	p.	12. 29	I	borrow	this	metaphor	from	Husserl	who	reflects,	in	September	1905	on	the	analogies	and	differences	between his	own	position	and	that	of	Meinong	and	describes	them	as	«two	travelers	on	one	and	the	same	dark	continent. Of	course	we	often	see	the	same	and	describe	it,	but	...	often	in	different	ways»	[My	translation:	«zwei	Reisende	in einem	und	demselben	dunklen	Weltteil.	Natürlich	sehen	wir	oft	dasselbe	und	beschreiben	es,	aber	...	vielfach	verschieden»]	E.	Husserl,	Einleitung	in	die	Logik	und	Erkenntnistheorie.	Vorlesungen	1906/07,	Husserliana,	XXIV,	U.	Melle (ed.),	Nijhoff,	Dordrecht	1984,	p.	444.	It	is	remarkable	that	we	find	similar	metaphors	regularly	among	Brentano's students,	which	shows	that	the	idea	of	discovering	and	exploring	new	areas	of	knowledge	was	widespread	among Brentano's	students.	In	his	biography	of	Brentano,	Kastil,	for	example,	describes	Brentano	as	a	philosopher	who was	interested	in	«penetrating	hitherto	unexplored	districts	of	truth»	[my	translation:	«das	Vordringen	in	noch uneroberte Bezirke der	Wahrheit»] A. Kastil,	Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos. Eine Einführung in seine Lehre. Francke,	Bern	1951,	p.	7. 10 geneity	as	one	could	expect.	In	what	follows	I	will	focus	on	two	reasons	why	the	group	of	Brentano's	students	did	not	form	a	homogeneous	group	that	could	perceived	as	such	by	their	contemporaries:	First,	many	of	Brentano's	students	wanted	to	be	perceived	not	as	members	of	a bigger	movement	that	had	been	founded	by	someone	else,	but	as independent	philosophers who	were	in	a	position	to	start	a	movement	or	a	school	in	their	own	right.	Second,	while	many of	Brentano's	direct	students	constitute	at	best	a	heterogeneous	group	of	philosophers,	who developed	in	very	different	directions,	the	second	generation	of	students	(Brentano's	so-called Enkelschüler)	appropriated	Brentano's	philosophy	and	established	a	new	orthodoxy	that	made it	even	more	difficult	for	less	devoted	students	to	officially	adhere	to	the	"true	doctrine". 3.1	Brentano's	independent	students It	is	often	reported	by	his	students	that	Brentano	tried	to	teach	his	students	to	become	independent	thinkers	on	their	own	and,	in	fact,	it	seems	that	he	was	more	successful	in	this	point than	he	wanted	to	be.	In	fact,	many	of	his	students	have	proven	to	have	an	open	eye	for	the theoretical	problems	in	the	discipline	and	the	capacity	to	develop	the	theoretical	framework	to address	these	problems. Many	of	Brentano's	students	built	on	his	seminal	distinction	between	descriptive	and genetic	psychology;	some	of	them,	in	particular	Carl	Stumpf	and	Alexius	Meinong,	tried	to	develop both strands and put a strong emphasis on laboratory research.	Meinong, as is well known, inaugurated	the first	psychological laboratory in the	Austro-Hungarian	Empire,	Carl Stumpf	established	a	psychological	laboratory	at	the	University	of	Berlin.	These	achievements were	essential	in	the	development	of	the	emergence	of	a	scientific	psychology.	In	this	scientific context, however,	where experimental results are typically	more important than individual thinkers	or	schools	of	thought,	they	were	more	likely	to	be	perceived	as	empirically	working scholars,	and	not	as	philosophers	who	were	part	of	the	Brentano	school.	Thus,	the	foundation of	psychological	laboratories,	that	was	so	much	demanded	by	Brentano,	overshadowed	the	particularly	Brentanian	heritage	of	Stumpf's	and	Meinong's	achievements	in	the	context	of	scientific	psychology. Things	might have gone in a different	manner if Brentano	would have succeeded in opening	and	guiding	his	own	research	laboratory;	in	this	case,	a	Brentanian	school	of	scientific psychology	might	have	become	a	leading	movement	that	could	have	considerably	shaped	the emergence	of	the	discipline.	As	Brentano	lost	his	academic	influence	after	his	resignation	from 11 the	position	as	full	professor	at	the	University	of	Vienna30,	however,	he	no	longer	had	the	academic	power	to	realize	such	a	project. Also	within	the	narrower	field	of	philosophy,	where	Brentano's	contributions	were	undisputed,	many	of	his	students	stood	up	for	their	independence	from	their	teacher,	though.	Both Meinong and Husserl, for example, developed a philosophical position that clearly shows Brentanian	roots,	but	goes	in	essential	respects	beyond	–	and	both	did	so	with	the	recognizable intention	to	form	a	movement	or	school	in	their	own	right,	the	theory	of	objects	and	phenomenology,	respectively. There	were	definitely	several	reasons	why	Meinong	and	Husserl	have	broken	with	Brentano;	some	of them	had	a	more	personal	nature31,	others	were	related	to	the	psychologistic tendencies	in	Brentano's	philosophy,	others	again	to	the	latter's	restrictive	views	in	metaphysics: After Twardowski's critique of Brentano's early conception of intentionality32 both Meinong	and	Husserl	opened	up	their	metaphysical	horizons,	while	Brentano	reacted	with	a radicalization	of	his	metaphysical	views	in	his	turn	towards	reism.33	One	additional	motive	for deviating	from	Brentano's	position,	which	is	more	central	to	the	discussion	of	this	paper,	is	related	to	methodological	questions. This	becomes	particularly	manifest	in	the	case	of	Husserl.	Like	Brentano,	Husserl	often insists	that	philosophy	should	be	considered	a	rigorous	science34,	but	his	conception	of	scientific	philosophy	deviates	considerably	from	Brentano's.	While	the	latter	argues	for	a	continuity of	method	between	philosophy	and	the	natural	sciences,	Husserl	advocates	a	hierarchical	understanding,	where	philosophy	prepares	the	ground	for	the	natural	sciences.	Moreover,	while Brentano	argues	that	philosophy	is	based	on	inner	perception,	Husserl	suggest	that	the	relevant 30	Brentano,	as	is	well	known,	resigned	from	his	position	in	1880	when	he	decided	to	get	married	with	Ida	von Lieben.	As	the	Austrian	laws	did	not	permit	a	wedding	for	former	priests,	Brentano	had	to	resign	from	his	Austrian citizenship	–	and	his	position	as	a	full	professor	–	to	become	Sassonian	citizen	and	get	married	in	Leipzig.	Brentano thought	that it	would	only	be	a	short-term	resignation	and	that	he	could	come	back	into	his	position	after	his wedding.	The	Austrian	ministry,	however,	did	not	play	along	and	Brentano	could	continue	teaching	at	the	University	of	Vienna	only	as	Privatdozent.	This	loss	of	academic	power	might	have	prevented	the	formation	of	a	strong Brentano	school	at	Vienna.	Moreover,	the	events	described	might	also	have	reinforced	Brentano's	notorious	reluctance	to	publish,	which	might	have	been	a	further	element	to	undermine	the	formation	of	a	school.	For	a	more detailed	discussion	of	this	aspect,	cf.	J.M.	Werle,	Franz	Brentano	und	die	Zukunft	der	Philosophie:	Studien	zur	Wissenschaftsgeschichte	und	Wissenschaftssystematik	im	19.	Jahrhundert,	Rodopi,	Amsterdam	&	Atlanta,	GA	1989. 31	As	I	have	mentioned	above	(cf.	footnote	15),	both	Meinong	and	Husserl	expressed	their	disappointment	about Brentano's	harsh	reactions	when	his	former	students	developed	view	he	could	not	share. 32 Cf. K. Twardowski,	On the Content and	Object of Presentations: A Psychological Investigation, R. Grossmann (trans.),	Nijhoff,	The	Hauge	1977. 33	In	a	letter	to	Marvin	Farber,	Husserl	comments:	«In	his	beginnings	he	seemed	to	strive	beyond	neo-scholastics; but	unfortunately	he	got	stuck	in	scholastics.	And	it	is	even	worse	in	his	late	writings.	This	is	destilled	scholastics.» [My	translation:	«In	seinen	Anfängen	schien	er	über	die	Neu-Scholastik	hinauszustreben;	aber	er	ist	leider	in	Scholastik stecken geblieben.	Und am Schlimmsten steht es	mit seinen	Altersschriften. Das ist destillirte Scholastik»] E. Husserl,	Briefwechsel,	Bd.	IV:	Die	Freiburger	Schüler,	E.	Schuhmann	and	K.	Schuhmann	(eds.),	Kluwer,	Dordrecht 1994,	p.	82. 34	Cf.,	for	example,	E.	Husserl,	Philosophie	als	strenge	Wissenschaft,	«Logos»,	1.3	(1911),	pp.	289-341. 12 data for philosophy can be gathered only by	a special procedure, the intuition of essences, which requires	a special form	of attention. In	short,	Husserl	might	have	been fascinated	by Brentano's	conception	of	method	in	his	early	days	as	a	student,	but	he	radically	broke	with	it when	he	came	to	elaborate	his	own	philosophical	position.	Even	in	his	late	works,	Husserl	came back to praise Brentano's	methodological approach, but	when he does so he typically also points	at	its	limitations.	In	Crisis,	for	example,	he	writes: Only	when	Brentano	made	the	demand	for	psychology	as	a	science	of	intentional	experience	was an	impulse	given	that	could	lead	further,	although	Brentano	himself	had	not	yet	overcome	objectivism	and	psychological	naturalism.35 Husserl,	thus,	continues	to	express	admiration	for	Brentano's	methodological	conception	and	to	praise	it	for	its	innovative	power,	but	uses	all	occasions	to	criticize	the	naturalistic and	sensualistic	roots	in	Brentano's	conception	which	he	thinks	to	have	overcome	with	his	phenomenological	method. This	shows	that	Brentano's	conception	of	the	method	of	philosophy	had	the	potential	to attract	young	and	talented	students,	but	it	did	not	prevent	them	from	deviating	from	Brentano's position	once	they	had	individuated	the	aspects	in	which	they	took	the	approach	to	be	insufficient.	In	the	light	of	this	discussion	it	might	be	surprising	that	in	a	recent	contribution,	which	I think	is	very	interesting,	Arnauld	Dewalque	has	individuated	Brentano's	method	and	his	metaphysical	views	as	the	unifying	element	of	the	Brentano	school	in	the	sense	that	they	are	shared by	all	and	only	the	members	of	the	Brentano	school.36	Dewalque	lists	a	set	of	nine	propositions that	he	takes	to	be	distinctive	of	Brentanianism;	they	are,	in	other	words,	necessary	and	jointly sufficient	conditions	for	membership	of	the	Brentano	school.	It	seems	to	me	that	the	sufficiency claim	can	be	criticized	for	being	overstated,	for	it	does	not	take	the	historical	and	geographical unity	of	the	school	into	consideration.	The	claim	concerning	necessity,	on	the	other	hand,	is	too strong,	for	it	considerably	restricts	the	Brentano	school.	It	seems	to	me,	for	example,	that	neither	Husserl	nor	Meinong	would	have	accepted	the	second	set	of	propositions	that	concern	the relation	between	philosophy	and	psychology	and	consists	in	the	following	claims: 35	Edmund	Husserl,	The	Crisis	of	European	Sciences	and	Transcendental	Phenomenology:	An	Introduction	to	Phenomenological	Philosophy,	David	Carr	(trans.),	Northwestern	University	Press,	Evanston	1970,	p.	298.	For	similar remarks,	cf.	Ibi,	p.	222f,	Ibi,	p.	233ff,	but	also	the	letter	to	Landgrebe	from	February	5,	1922,	reprinted	in	Husserl, Briefwechsel,	Bd.	IV:	Die	Freiburger	Schüler,	p.	304ff. 36	Cf.	A.	Dewalque,	The	Unity	of	the	Brentano	School,	in	U.	Kriegel	(ed.)	Routledge	Handbook	of	Franz	Brentano	and the	Brentano	School,	Routledge,	New	York	2017,	pp.	236-48. 13 C4	Philosophical	sciences cannot achieve their goal	without relying	upon investigations into mental	phenomena. C5	[The	reason	it	is	so	is	that]	philosophy	uses	empirical	concepts,	which	have	their	source	in inner	perception. C6	[Therefore]	philosophy	must	rely	upon	psychology.37 These	propositions,	and	in	particular	C5	and	C6,	are	at	odds	with	Husserl's	critique	of psychologism,	his	critique	of	inner	perception,	and	his	views	on	eidetic	intuition.	For	this	reason,	I	would	like	to	suggest	that	the	nine	propositions	that	are	listed	by	Dewalque	should	not be	read	as	necessary	and jointly	sufficient	conditions,	but	rather	as	prototypical theses	that allow	us	to	detect	a	family	resemblance	among	members	of	the	school.	This	would	allow	us	to continue	to	speak	of	the	Brentano	school	in	a	looser	sense	that	refers	to	a	group	of	philosophers who	worked	in	a	given	historical	and	geographic	context	on	similar	problems,	applying	or	developing	similar	methods.	It	would	require	us	to	give	up	the	idea	that	there	is	a	clearly	circumscribed	school	or	that	we	could	determine	whether	someone	was	a	member	of	the	school	on the	basis	of	necessary	and	jointly	sufficient	conditions,	though.	The	nine	propositions	listed	by Dewalque	could	still	function	as	a	useful	touchstone	that	can	help	to	individuate	deviations	of individual	students	who	took	distance	of	the	school,	but	continued	to	acknowledge	the	influence	that	Brentano	had	exerted	on	them. 3.2	The	Role	of	Orthodox	Brentanianism It	is,	I	think,	a	merit	of	Dewalque's	proposal	that	it	tries	to	give	a	sort	of	rational	reconstruction of	what	it	might	have	meant	to	be	a	member	of	the	Brentano	school.	In	a	project	of	this	kind, which	deals	with	a	sort	of	idealization, it	is	possible,	if	not	desired,	to	leave	out	historical	or geographical	details	that	are	not	pertinent	for	these	narrow	purposes.	If	we	aim	to	get	an	understanding	of	the	historical	reality	of	a	Brentano	school,	on	the	other	hand,	we	cannot	leave out	aspects	that	were	less	rational,	but	might	nonetheless	have	been	decisive	for	the	course	of the	events.	In	this	perspective,	one	would	have	to	take	aspects	like	rivalry,	personal	antagonisms, or inappropriate appropriations into account. The short, but little friendly letter exchange	between	Alexius	Meinong	and	Edmund	Husserl,	for	example,	might	give	an	idea	why the	two	did	not	make	a	joint	attempt	to	reform	and	further	develop	Brentano's	methodological approach.38	A	thorough	examination	of	all	relevant	factors	of	this	kind,	which	span	over	a	finely 37	Ibi,	p.	246. 38	For	a	more	detailed	discussion,	cf.	W.	Huemer,	Husserl's	Critique	of	Psychologism	and	his	Relation	to	the	Brentano School,	in	A.	Chrudzimski	and	W.	Huemer	(eds.),	Phenomenology	and	Analysis:	Essays	on	Central-European	Philosophy,	ontos	Verlag,	Frankfurt	a.M.	2004),	pp.	199-215. 14 woven	web	of	personal	relations	of	a	large	number	of	persons,	goes,	of	course,	far	beyond	the scope	of	this	paper.	For	this	reason,	I	would	like	to	focus	only	on	one	contingent	factor,	which, I	think,	ironically	was	a	great	obstacle	for	the	formation	of	a	Brentano	school	in	a	larger	sense: the	attempts	of	Brentano's	second	generation	students	(Enkelschüler)	in	Prague,	Oskar	Kraus or	Alfred	Kastil,	to	promote	a	Brentano	school	(in	a	more	restricted	sense).	The	two	have	gotten to	know	Brentano	only	in	his	late	years,	when	he	did	not	hold	any	university	position	any	longer and	was	weakened	by	his	blindness	and	took,	in	consequence	Brentano's	late	position,	especially	his	reism,	as	the	most	authentic	of	his	views. I	have	mentioned	above	that	according	to	Stumpf,	Brentano	never	had	the	intention	to form	a	school,	while	Husserl	stated	that	it	would	have	been	important	for	Brentano	to	have	a school	«in	the	good	sense»39.	Husserl's	remark	shows	that	the	term	"school"	was	not	always used	with	positive	connotations	at	the	time,	for	they	can	easily	become	dogmatic	and,	thus,	unscientific.	It	seems	to	me	that	the	efforts	of	the	"Brenanoten"	(as	they	were	called	in	Prague) Kraus	and	Kastil	were	often	perceived in	this	way	by	some	of	Brentano's	direct	students,	as they	seemed	to	have	had	very	clear	ideas	about	the	"true	doctrine"	and	were	quick	to	criticize others	for	deviating	from	original	Brentano's	position.	This	attitude	might	have	awakened	the urge in many "Brentanians" (in a large sense) to distance themselves from the "Brentano school". In fact, also	Arnauld	Dewalque	acknowledges that the term	«Brentano	school»	was used	among	Brentano's	students	also	to	«distance	themselves	from	what	they	take	to	be	sheer Brentanian	orthodoxy.»40 When	asked	by	Marvin	Farber	for	his	relation	to	Oskar	Kraus,	for	example,	Husserl	not only	expresses	his	bewilderment	about	the	conduct	of	the	"Brentano	school",	he	also	takes	the occasion	to	distance	himself	from	Brentano. Kraus	...	is	basically	a	good	guy,	but	as	Brentanist	he	is	a	real	fanatic,	a	kind	of	Torquemada.	He would	not	hesitate,	if	he	had	the	power,	to	burn	Brentano's	enemies	at	the	stake.	Including	me and	my	friends,	for	I	began	in	my	youth	as	an	enthusiastic	admirer	of	Brentano	and	took	myself for	too	long	a	time,	in	a	self-delusion,	which	now	is	difficult	to	understand,	to	be	a	collaborator of	his	philosophy	and	in	particular	his	psychology.41 39	Cf.	above,	note	15. 40	A.	Dewalque,	The	Rise	of	the	Brentano	School,	in	U.	Kriegel	(ed.),	Routledge	Handbook	of	Franz	Brentano	and	the Brentano	School,	Routledge,	New	York	2017,	pp.	225-35,	p.	225. 41	Husserl,	Briefwechsel,	Bd.	IV:	Die	Freiburger	Schüler,	p.	82.	[My	translation:	«Kraus	...	ist	eigentlich	ein	"guter	Kerl", aber	als	Brentanist	ein	arger	Fanatiker,	eine	Art	Torquemada.	Er	würde	die	Gegner	Brentano's	ohne	eine	Miene	zu verziehen,	wenn	er	die	Macht	hätte,	auf	Scheiterhaufen	verbrennen.	Darunter	mich	u.	meine	Freunde,	denn	ich	fieng zwar	in	der	Jugend	als	begeisterter	Verehrer	Br<entano>s	an	u.	hielt	mich,	allzulange,	in	einer	jetzt	schwer	verständlichen	Selbsttäuschung,	für	einen	Mitarbeiter	an	seiner	Philosophie,	u.	insbesondere	seiner	Psychologie.»] 15 For	sure,	Husserl	had	taken	distances	from	Brentano	already	beforehand,	but	I	find	it telling	that	in	this	letter	he	finds	strong	words	of	regret	for	his	former	enthusiasm	for	Brentano when	answering	a	question	concerning	Oskar	Kraus. Similarly,	also	Meinong	insists	in	a	letter	to	Twardowski	in	his	independence	from	Brentano and complains that this independence	was not seen from	philosophers of outside the school,	but	that	he	was	criticized	for	it	from	within.	Meinong	writes:	«the	less	informed	interpret	my	relation	to	Brentano	very	much	to	the	disadvantage	of	my	independence,	while	it	is	my very	independence	that	is	so	often	criticized	by	the	"orthodox"».42 This	statement	illustrates	very	well	the	tension	in	which	the	more	independent	students of	Brentano	have	found	themselves:	From	the	outside	they	were	often	perceived	as	students	of Brentano,	while	orthodox	Brentanists	treated	them	as	traitors	of	the	true	doctrine.	It	is	obvious that	they	must	have	felt	uncomfortable	in	both	roles,	for	both	Husserl	and	Meinong	saw	themselves	as	independent	philosophers,	or	even	as	founders	of	philosophical	schools	in	their	own right,	who	have	had	a	great	debt	to	Brentano,	but	always	strived	for	developing	a	position	of their	own. 4.	Conclusion The	discussion	so far illustrates	well, I think	that the	term	"Brentano	school" is	most	useful when	it	is	used	not	in	a	narrow	or	restrictive,	but	in	a	loose	way	that	includes	all	those	philosophers	who	have	had	direct	or	indirect	contact	with	Brentano	and	have	been	influenced	by	his position	–	even	if	they	later	might	have	felt	it	necessary	to	emend	or	modify	parts	of	the	doctrine.	Brentano	was	often	described	as	a	charismatic	teacher;	he	impressed	a	large	number	of students	with	his	views	about	the	nature	of	philosophy,	its	method,	and	its	content,	in	particular the	emerging	discipline	of	psychology.	Moreover,	he	invited	his	students	to	become	independent	thinkers	in	their	own	right	and	to	conduct	their	own	research	in	ways	that	are	appropriate to	the	phenomena.	The	fact	that	Brentano	(or,	for	that	reasons,	the	orthodox	Brentanists)	could not	approve	of	many	of	the	individual	achievements	of	his	former	students,	should	not	make	us overlook	that	Brentano	exerted	an	impact	on	the	development	of	philosophy	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century	mainly	through	his	former	students	Brentano,	especially	the 42	Meinong's	letter	from	July	2,	1897	is	reprinted	in:	A.	Meinong	and	K.	Twardowski,	Der	Briefwechsel,	Venanzio Raspa	(ed.),	De	Gruyter,	Boston	2016,	p.	82.	[My	translation:	...	minder	Orientierte	mein	Verhältnis	zu	Brentano sehr	zum	Schaden	meiner	Selbständigkeit	zurecht	legen,	indes	es	doch	gerade	diese	Selbständigkeit	ist,	die	mir	die „Rechtgläubigen"	so	sehr	zum	Vorwurfe	machen.»].	Meinong	refers	to	a	passage	in	Friedrich	Ueberwegs	Grundriss der	Geschichte	der	Philosophie,	where	he	is	characterized	as	an	admirer	of	Brentano. 16 more	independent	ones.	This	fact	that	could	easily	be	overlooked	if	we	apply	a	too	narrow	conception	of	the	"Brentano	school"	or	make	adherence	to	the	school	dependent	on	criteria	that are	overly	restrictive. References Albertazzi,	Liliana,	Massimo	Libardi,	and	Roberto	Poli,	eds.,	The	School	of	Franz	Brentano,	Kluwer,	Dordrecht	1996. Brentano,	Franz,	Descriptive	Psychology,	Benito	Müller	(trans.),	Routledge,	London	&	New	York	1995. -,	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint,	O.	Kraus	and	L.L.	McAlister	(eds.),	A.C.	Rancurello,	D.B.	Terrell,	and	L.L.	McAlister	(trans.),	Routledge,	London	&	New	York	1995. -,	The	Four	Phases	of	Philosophy,	in	B.M.	Mezei	and	B.	Smith	(eds.),	The	Four	Phases	of	Philosophy, Rodopi,	Amsterdam,	Atlanta,	GA	1998,	pp.	81–111. -,	Über	die	Zukunft	der	Philosophie,	O.	Kraus	(ed.)	Meiner,	Leipzig	1929. Dewalque,	Arnauld,	The	Rise	of	the	Brentano	School, in	U.	Kriegel	(ed.)	Routledge	Handbook	of	Franz Brentano	and	the	Brentano	School,	Routledge,	New	York	2017,	pp.	225–35. -,	The	Unity	of	the	Brentano	School,	in	U.	Kriegel	(ed.)	Routledge	Handbook	of	Franz	Brentano	and	the Brentano	School,	Routledge,	New	York	2017,	pp.	236–48. Freudenberger,	Theobald,	Die	Universität	Würzburg	und	das	erste	vatikanische	Konzil:	ein	Beitrag	zur Kirchenund	Geistesgeschichte	des	19.	Jahrhunderts,	Degener,	Neustadt	a.d.	Aisch	1969. Höfler,	Alois,	Franz	Brentano	in	Wien,	in:	«Süddeutsche	Monatshefte»	May	1917,	pp.	319–25. Huemer,	Wolfgang,	Husserl's Critique of Psychologism and his Relation to the Brentano School, in A. Chrudzimski	and	W.	Huemer	(eds.),	Phenomenology	and	Analysis:	Essays	on	Central-European Philosophy,	ontos	Verlag,	Frankfurt	a.M.	2004,	pp.	199–215. -,	Was	Brentano	a	systematic	philosopher?	in	M.	Antonelli	and	T.	Binder	(eds.)	The	Philosophy	of	Franz Brentano,	Brill,	Leiden	forthcoming. Husserl,	Edmund,	Briefwechsel,	Bd.	IV:	Die	Freiburger	Schüler,	E.	Schuhmann	and	K.	Schuhmann	(eds.) Kluwer,	Dordrecht	1994. -,	Einleitung	in	die	Logik	und	Erkenntnistheorie.	Vorlesungen	1906/07,	Husserliana,	XXIV,	Ullrich	Melle (ed.),	Nijhoff,	Dordrecht	1984. -,	Philosophie	als	strenge	Wissenschaft,	in	«Logos»	1.3	(1911),	pp.	289–341. -,	Reminiscences	of	Franz	Brentano, in	L.L.	McAlister	(ed.)	The	Philosophy	of	Brentano,	L.L.	McAlister and	Margarete	Schättle	(trans.)	Duckworth,	London	1976),	pp.	47–55. -,	The	Crisis	of	European	Sciences	and	Transcendental	Phenomenology:	An	Introduction	to	Phenomenological	Philosophy,	David	Carr	(trans.),	Northwestern	University	Press,	Evanston	1970. Kastil,	Alfred,	Die	Philosophie	Franz	Brentanos.	Eine	Einführung	in	seine	Lehre,	Francke,	Bern	1951. Kriegel,	Uriah,	Brentano's	Philosophical	Program,	in	U.	Kriegel	(ed.),	The	Routledge	Handbook	of	Franz Brentano	and	the	Brentano	School,	Routledge,	New	York	2017),	pp.	21–32. -,	ed.,	The	Routledge	Handbook	of	Franz	Brentano	and	the	Brentano	School,	Routledge,	New	York	2017. Meinong,	Alexius,	Selbstdarstellung,	in	R.	Schmidt	(ed.),	Die	Philosophie	der	Gegenwart	in	Selbstdarstellungen,	Meiner,	Leipzig	1923,	pp.	100–160. Meinong,	Alexius,	and	Kazimierz	Twardowski,	Der	Briefwechsel,	V.	Raspa	(ed.)	De	Gruyter,	Boston	2016. Mezei,	Balázs	M,	and	Barry	Smith,	The	Four	Phases	of	Philosophy,	Rodopi,	Amsterdam,	Atlanta,	GA	1998. Stumpf,	Carl,	Erinnerungen	an	Franz	Brentano,	in	Franz	Brentano:	Zur	Kenntnis	seines	Lebens	und	seiner Werke	(München:	Beck,	1919),	pp.	85–149 -,	'Reminiscences	of	Franz	Brentano',	in	L.L.	McAlister	(ed.)	The	Philosophy	of	Brentano,	L.L.	McAlister and	M.	Schättle	(trans.)	Duckworth,	London	1976,	pp.	10–46. Twardowski,	Kazimierz,	On the	Content and	Object of Presentations:	A	Psychological Investigation, R. Grossmann	(trans.),	Nijhoff,	The	Hauge	1977. Werle,	Josef	M.,	Franz	Brentano	und	die	Zukunft	der	Philosophie:	Studien	zur	Wissenschaftsgeschichte	und Wissenschaftssystematik	Im	19.	Jahrhundert,	Rodopi,	Amsterdam	&	Atlanta,	GA	1989.